Why is anything here

Whether we believe in one or many, we have the question why any Big Bang has occurred. Though this question is hard, the occurrence of many Big Bangs is not more puzzling than the occurrence of only one.

Most kinds of thing, or event, have many instances. We also have the question why, in the Big Bang that produced our world, the initial conditions allowed for complexity and life. If there has been only one Big Bang, this fact is also hard to explain, since it is most unlikely that these conditions merely happened to be right. If, instead, there have been many Big Bangs, this fact is easy to explain, since it is like the fact that, among countless planets, there are some whose conditions allow for life.

Since belief in many Big Bangs leaves less that is unexplained, it is the better view. If some cosmic possibilities would be less puzzling than others, because their obtaining would leave less to be explained, is there some possibility whose obtaining would be in no way puzzling?

Consider first the Null Possibility, in which nothing ever exists. To imagine this possibility, it may help to suppose first, that all that ever existed was a single atom. We then imagine that even this atom never existed. But that is not so. When we imagine how things would have been if nothing had ever existed, what we should imagine away are such things as living beings, stars and atoms. There would still have been various truths, such as the truth that there were no stars or atoms, or that 9 is divisible by 3.

We can ask why these things would have been true. And such questions may have answers. Thus we can explain why, even if nothing had ever existed, 9 would still have been divisible by 3. There is no conceivable alternative. And we can explain why there would have been no such things as immaterial matter, or spherical cubes. Such things are logically impossible. But why would nothing have existed? Why would there have been no stars or atoms, no philosophers or bluebell woods?

We should not claim that, if nothing had ever existed, there would have been nothing to be explained. But we can claim something less. Of all the global possibilities, the Null Possibility would have needed the least explanation. As Leibniz pointed out, it is much the simplest, and the least arbitrary. And it is the easiest to understand. It can seem mysterious, for example, how things could exist without their existence having some cause, but there cannot be a causal explanation of why the whole Universe, or God, exists.

The Null Possibility raises no such problem. If nothing had ever existed, that state of affairs would not have needed to be caused. Reality, however, does not take its least puzzling form. In some way or other, a Universe has managed to exist. Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, in which every possible local world exists. Unlike the Null Possibility, this may be how things are. And it may be the next least puzzling possibility. This hypothesis is not the same as — though it includes — the Many Worlds Hypothesis.

On that more cautious view, many other worlds have the same elements as our world, and the same fundamental laws, and differ only in such features as their constants and initial conditions. The All Worlds Hypothesis covers every conceivable kind of world, and most of these other worlds would have very different elements and laws.

If all these worlds exist, we can ask why they do. But, compared with most other cosmic possibilities, the All Worlds Hypothesis may leave less that is unexplained. With every other cosmic possibility, we have a further question. It may be objected that, even if all possible local worlds exist, that does not explain why our world is as it is.

But that is a mistake. If all these worlds exist, each world is as it is in the way in which each number is as it is. We cannot sensibly ask why 9 is 9. Nor should we ask why our world is the one it is: why it is this world. Though the All Worlds Hypothesis avoids certain questions, it is not as simple, or un-arbitrary, as the Null Possibility.

There may be no sharp distinction between worlds that are and are not possible. It is unclear what counts as a kind of world. And, if there are infinitely many kinds, there is a choice between different kinds of infinity. Whichever cosmic possibility obtains, we can ask why it obtains. All that I have claimed so far is that, with some possibilities, this question would be less puzzling.

Let us now ask: could this question have an answer? Might there be a theory that leaves nothing unexplained?

It is sometimes claimed that God, or the Universe, make themselves exist. But this cannot be true, since these entities cannot do anything unless they exist. On a more intelligible view, it is logically necessary that God, or the Universe, exist, since the claim that they might not have existed leads to a contradiction. On such a view, though it may seem conceivable that there might never have been anything, that is not really logically possible.

Some people even claim that there may be only one coherent cosmic possibility. Thus Einstein suggested that, if God created our world, he might have had no choice about which world to create. If such a view were true, everything might be explained. Reality might be the way it is because there was no conceivable alternative. But, for reasons that have been often given, we can reject such views. Consider next a quite different view.

According to Plato, Plotinus and others, the Universe exists because its existence is good. Even if we are confident that we should reject this view, it is worth asking whether it makes sense. If it does, that may suggest other possibilities. This Axiarchic View can take a theistic form. It can claim that God exists because his existence is good, and that the rest of the Universe exists because God caused it to exist.

But in that explanation God, qua Creator, is redundant. If God can exist because his existence is good, so can the whole Universe. The Axiarchic View assumes, I believe rightly, that such claims can be in a strong sense true.

What is distinctive in this view is claim 3 , according to which 1 explains 2. Can we understand this third claim? We should suppose that, as Leibniz claimed, the best possible Universe exists. Would it then make sense to claim that this Universe exists because it is the best?

But even ordinary causation is mysterious. At the most fundamental level, we have no idea why some events cause others; and it is hard to explain what causation is. We can understand that claim, even if we think it false. The Axiarchic View is harder to understand. But that is not surprising. If there is some explanation of the whole of reality, we should not expect this explanation to fit neatly into some familiar category.

This extra-ordinary question may have an extra-ordinary answer. We should reject suggested answers which make no sense; but we should also try to see what might make sense. Why is there a world, a cosmos, something, anything instead of absolutely nothing at all? If nothing existed, there would be nothing to explain. That anything exists demands some kind of explanation.

Of all the big questions, this is the biggest. Why anything? Why not nothing? What can we learn from the absence of nothing? View the discussion thread. Skip to main content. Closer to Truth Closer to Truth. Why does all this something exist? And where the hell are we? More logical, to me, is the bubbling, frothing multiverse situation—but okay, we still then have the same problem. Why is this bubbling thing happening?

Where is it happening? In what context is it happening? In a library somewhere? Is it part of a word that exists by itself? Is it a single letter all alone? We have no fucking idea, because all we can see is this one letter. Paid quarterly.

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