How long did nato bomb kosovo

This bombing effort, code-named Operation Allied Force, ended 78 days later with the capitulation of Yugoslavia's president, Slobodan Milosevic, and the subsequent withdrawal of Serbian army and paramilitary forces from Kosovo. Yet despite its success in bringing about Milosevic's defeat, Operation Allied Force was a suboptimal use of air power to resolve a regional conflict.

Although NATO's air offensive ultimately proved crucial to Milosevic's decision to submit to NATO's terms, a host of deficiencies—both strategic and operational—protracted the air effort and hampered its overall effectiveness.

Figure 1 shows a map of the immediate area of operations. Lambeth offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, with a view toward shedding light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. After outlining the main highlights of NATO's air offensive, the study examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. It then explores air power's most notable accomplishments in Allied Force, as well as the many problems and sources of friction that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution.

Finally, the report assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. Although NATO's bombing effort in the end played the determining role in bringing about Milosevic's defeat, a host of additional factors also figured importantly in this respect. In addition to the damage that was being wrought by NATO's air attacks, for example, another factor that very likely contributed to Milosevic's surrender was the sheer depravity of Serbia's conduct in Kosovo, which ultimately stripped it of what little remained of international support, most notably from the Russians.

Yet another element that may have come into play was pressure from Yugoslavia's elite, for whom NATO's bombing of key industrial and economic interests in and around Belgrade had begun to take an intensely personal toll. Milosevic was, in addition, almost surely aware of the growing potential for a ground invasion as NATO's air war progressed. By the end of May , it had become clear that NATO had increasingly accepted the need to go ahead with a ground invasion in the event that its air effort alone failed to bring about a decisive outcome.

Although senior officials in Washington remained highly resistant to proceeding with that course right up the very end, Milosevic cannot have failed to apprehend the implications of such a possibility. At the same time, Milosevic was bearing witness to an escalating air war that showed no signs of abating Figure 2. Although NATO's efforts to find and attack dispersed and hidden enemy forces in Kosovo had proved largely ineffective, an increasing number of infrastructure targets were being hit each day, and these attacks were taking a mounting toll both on Yugoslavia's leadership and on the population as a whole.

It is thus likely that NATO's air offensive ultimately convinced Milosevic that the alliance not only intended to persist in its attacks but was determined to prevail. Milosevic insisted the air strikes were illegal, and his forces struck back against the Kosovo Albanians.

Locals from a village some 30 kilometres west of Belgrade rolling a wing of the crashed US F stealth bomber on March 28, Ordinary life continued somehow despite the daily attacks from the air. She and her friends were taken to a police station where they were interrogated for a couple of hours, but the wedding went ahead the following day. The bride wore the white dress she had finally retrieved from the dressmaker at about 2am, after being released from the police station.

Ethnic Albanian refugee children peer out of a car after crossing the border from Kosovo into Macedonia in Blace, March 28, Some of the most controversial strikes during the bombing of Belgrade were the attack on the RTS television building, and the strike that hit the Chinese embassy on May 7, NATO insisted the embassy was bombed by accident.

Watching the war at close range in Kosovo, Avni Zogiani feared for the lives of his ethnic Albanian compatriots. I was horrified by what I saw. For an entire year, he was reporting on killings by Serbian forces, and people were living in constant fear of death or expulsion, he recalled. People were locked in [their homes] due to the fear that they might encounter Serb forces. During the NATO military campaign, the Serbian government estimates that at least 2, people died and 12, were injured, but the exact death toll remains unclear.

They went on to present themselves as humanitarian heroes at home. Others saw their actions as imperialism. The campaign also resulted in massive collateral damage. There were hundreds of civilian victims. The bombing dramatically shaped the political future of Kosovo. It paved the way towards its unilaterally declared independence on February 17 — a move which was encouraged by Washington and some European allies.

At first glance, it would seem that this development would solve the crisis in Kosovo. But Kosovo is far from achieving full international recognition. It is, for one thing, still unable to join the UN, the gold standard when it comes to statehood. Even if enough states did support its bid for membership, Kosovo could face a veto — certainly from Russia and probably from China. For all Kosovo officials I have talked to, nevertheless, the meaning of the term is crystal clear — full mutual recognition.

The problem is that if a solution is not found, further border alterations could be on the cards.